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Spatial redundancy in critical infrastructures under the EU-RESILIENT SHIELD approach

The COPEU EU-RESILIENT SHIELD programme articulates a European resilience framework aimed at guaranteeing the operational continuity of critical infrastructures in the energy, transport and communications sectors through the use of space capabilities as a backup layer. Its conceptual architecture is based on the premise that conventional terrestrial networks present systemic vulnerabilities to disruptions of physical, cyber or meteorological origin, and that the provision of connectivity and positioning from the space segment can act as a mechanism of active, rather than merely passive, redundancy. From a technical standpoint, spatial redundancy in this context entails the integration of multiple service layers: satellite broadband connectivity for the continuity of SCADA and remote supervision systems, high-integrity positioning based on GNSS with SSR corrections distributed via satellite, and Earth observation capabilities for the rapid assessment of infrastructure status following disruption events. The combination of GEO, MEO and LEO orbits allows architectures to be designed with different latency, coverage and availability profiles according to the criticality level of each asset. The operational limitations of this approach are significant and must be considered in system design. Dependence on the space segment introduces its own vulnerability: radio frequency interference, jamming or spoofing of GNSS signals, and severe space weather events can simultaneously degrade multiple service layers. For this reason, EU-RESILIENT SHIELD incorporates design criteria oriented towards provider diversification, the separation of control and data planes, and the validation of integrity at the receiver through signal authentication techniques such as OSNMA in the case of Galileo. The European regulatory context is a determining factor for the viability of this type of architecture. The NIS2 Directive and the Critical Entities Resilience Regulation (CER) establish service continuity obligations that infrastructure operators must fulfil, and which open a normative space for the certification of space-based backup solutions as recognised components of risk management plans. Coordination between agencies such as ENISA, GSA and the European Space Agency is structurally necessary to harmonise space cybersecurity requirements with existing sectoral frameworks. For system operators and integrators, the technical value of EU-RESILIENT SHIELD lies in its capacity to establish a common requirements language between the space sector and critical infrastructure managers, facilitating the specification of service levels, recovery times and residual risk acceptance criteria. The maturity of this approach will depend to a considerable extent on the ability to harmonise interface standards between legacy terrestrial systems and next-generation space segments.

NASSAT - Network Satellite Systems